A May 12 memo from the head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, Matthew Galeotti, states that the division’s enforcement priorities for prosecuting corporate and white-collar crimes will include “trade and customs fraudsters, including those who commit tariff evasion.” To reflect that effort the division is expanding its corporate whistleblower awards pilot program to add “trade, tariff, and customs fraud by corporations” as a priority area.
At the same time, Galeotti told a recent conference, “excessive enforcement and unfocused corporate investigations stymie innovation, limit prosperity, and reduce efficiency.” The Criminal Division is therefore “turning a new page on white-collar and corporate enforcement” by implementing “policies that emphasize the role of and benefits for law-abiding companies and companies that are ready to acknowledge and learn from their mistakes.”
For example, Galeotti said, the Criminal Division has revised its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy to make it easier for companies to avoid criminal prosecution. Those that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate, timely and appropriately remediate, and have no aggravating circumstances will not be required to enter into a criminal resolution. Companies that are willing to meet these criteria but do have aggravating circumstances may still be eligible for a declination of prosecution based on weighing the severity of those circumstances and the company’s cooperation and remediation. Finally, companies that in good faith self-disclose either not quickly enough or after the DOJ has become aware of the misconduct are still eligible to receive a non-prosecution agreement with a term of fewer than three years, a 75 percent reduction of the criminal fine, and no compliance monitor.
Further, the memo states that independent compliance monitors must only be imposed when a company cannot be expected to implement an effective compliance program or prevent recurrence of the underlying misconduct without “such heavy-handed intervention.” When they are imposed, monitorships must be narrowly tailored to achieve the necessary goals while minimizing expense, burden, and interference with the business. The Criminal Division is reviewing all existing monitorships under this standard to determine whether each is still necessary.
Copyright © 2025 Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; WorldTrade Interactive, Inc. All rights reserved.