President Trump issued March 24 an executive order opening the door for 25 percent tariffs on imports from countries that import oil from Venezuela. Press reports note that such “secondary tariffs” appear to be a new tool and, in this case, would likely impact countries like China, India, and Spain (which, along with the U.S., are the four biggest importers of Venezuelan oil).
Citing authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and based on a national emergency declared in 2015 (and continued in February 2025), Trump determined that “the actions and policies of the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” He specifically cited the Maduro regime’s actions to facilitate the influx of members of the Tren de Aragua gang into the U.S. as well as its undermining of democratic institutions, endemic economic mismanagement and public corruption, and destabilization of the Western Hemisphere through “the forced migration of millions of Venezuelans.”
In response, the EO states that on or after April 2 a tariff of 25 percent may be imposed on all goods imported into the U.S. from any country that directly or indirectly imports Venezuelan oil (i.e., crude oil or petroleum products extracted, refined, or exported from Venezuela, regardless of the nationality of the entity involved in the production or sale). Such tariffs would be supplemental to any duties already imposed pursuant to IEEPA, section 232 of the Trade Expansion of 1962, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, or any other authority. Once imposed, such tariffs would not expire until one year after the last date on which the country imported Venezuelan oil (though exceptions could be granted).
Under the EO, the secretary of commerce will determine whether a country has imported Venezuelan oil and the secretary of state will have authority to then determine whether and when tariffs may be imposed (and to actually impose them). The secretary of state historically has not had authority over import tariffs, but a recent notice from Secretary Rubio claimed such authority on the grounds that cross-border trade constitutes a “foreign affairs function.”
Finally, the EO orders the secretaries of state and commerce to report every 180 days on the effectiveness of any tariffs imposed.
ST&R offers a three-pronged approach to avoiding, mitigating, and/or recovering these and other tariffs. Click here to stay up to date on the latest tariff developments, or contact ST&R at tariffs@strtrade.com for more information.
Copyright © 2026 Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; WorldTrade Interactive, Inc. All rights reserved.
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