Numerous Items Moved from U.S. Munitions List to Commerce Control List
The Bureau of Industry and Security has issued a final rule adding to the Export Administration Regulations export controls on military vehicles and related items; vessels of war and related items; submersible vessels, oceanographic equipment and related items; and auxiliary and miscellaneous items that the president has determined no longer warrant control on the U.S. Munitions List. This rule also adds to the EAR export controls on items within the scope of the Munitions List of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies that are not specifically identified on the USML or the Commerce Control List but that were subject to USML jurisdiction. Finally, this rule moves certain items that were already subject to the EAR to the new export control classification numbers created by this rule.
Concurrently, the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has issued a final rule revising USML categories VI (surface vessels of war and special naval equipment), VII (ground vehicles), XIII (materials and miscellaneous articles), and XX (submersible vessels and related articles) to control those articles the president has determined warrant control in those categories of the USML.
Both of these rules will be effective 180 days after July 8, or approximately Jan. 8, 2014.
These rules are being issued as part of the Export Control Reform Initiative, which includes amendments to (a) the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the USML so that they control only those items that provide the U.S. with a critical military or intelligence advantage or otherwise warrant such controls and (b) the EAR to control military items that do not warrant USML controls. These changes are designed to enhance national security by improving the interoperability of U.S. military forces with allied countries; strengthening the U.S. industrial base by, among other things, reducing incentives for foreign manufacturers to design out and avoid U.S.-origin content and services; and allowing export control officials to focus government resources on transactions that pose greater national security, foreign policy or proliferation concerns than those involving NATO allies and other multi-regime partners.